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ARTICLES

I

The Caspian: Is It a Lake, a Sea or an
Ocean and Does It Matter? The
Danger of Utilizing Unilateral
Approaches to Resolving
Regional/International Issues
Barry Hart Dubner*
Preface
In 1986, I went swimming in the Caspian (Sea, Lake, Ocean).
My wife and I were staying in Baku, "the windy city." At that
time there were many interesting sights to see in the area. I chose
the swim. However, much to my surprise, swimming in the
Caspian was like swimming in an oil slick. Everything in that
geographic area (Azerbaijan) looked old, relics from the past,
especially the oil derricks. I just assumed that nobody cared much
about pollution problems and continued on with the tour.
* Barry Hart Dubner, J.D., LL.M., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor, Thomas M.
Cooley Law School, Lansing, Michigan. I would like to acknowledge and thank
my research assistants, Michael Rosenblatt and Sherry Stephenson; my teaching
assistant, Melissa Habeck; my secretary, Jill Pullum; my wife for all of her
editorial comments; and my library liaison, Sharon Bradley. The cutoff date for
research is 30 March 1999.
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Recently, I prepared a report on international law of the sea
events in 1998.1 In reviewing 1998 newspaper articles, I noticed
that there was much interest in the Caspian because of the vast oil
and gas potential for the area. What triggered my concern for that
area were at least two items: (1) that the Aral Sea is decreasing in
size at an alarming rate so that the environmental effects could be
disastrous; and (2) that Turkey was threatening to hold up oil
tanker traffic in the Bosporus (an international strait) because of
alleged environmental and public safety concerns.2
It occurred to me that a certain amount of cooperation among
the littoral States (and other States as well) will be necessary in
order to protect the Caspian and, by so doing, protect the people
in that part of the world.
The purpose of this article is to address the problems that
would occur if littoral and other interested States began utilizing
unilateral declarations and actions instead of utilizing an
international/regional
approach for the "common heritage of
3
mankind."
I.

Introduction

The development of international law is an ongoing, evolving
process. Without this process, there would be chaos. The 1982
Law of the Sea Treaty ("Convention") was drafted as a
framework for identifying and resolving problems that may
develop with regard to jurisdiction in ocean and maritime
environmental situations that could arise during the exploration of
various regions.4 The Caspian has the potential for the creation of
such problems due to its estimated oil reserves in that basin. To
illustrate, compare the following estimated reserves of the Caspian
basin (in billions
of barrels) to the proven oil reserves of other
5
nations in 1998.

1. The report appeared in the A.B.A. International Lawyer during the
summer, 1999. In August, 1999, I took over as Chairman of the Committee on
Law of the Sea, A.B.A. Section on International Law.
2. Stephen Kinzer, Turks Fear an Oil Disasteras the Bosporus Gets Busier,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998, at 8.
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/conf.
62/122, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Sales No. E. 83. V5., 21 ILM 1282 [hereinafter
Convention]. The theme of the 1982 Convention was the "common heritage of
mankind."
4. Convention, supra note 3.
5. Frank Viviano, PerilousLifeline to West; Conflict-ridden CaspianBasin is
the World's Next Persian Gulf,S. F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1998, at Al.
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Caspian Basin (estimated) 200-300
262
Saudi Arabia
110
Iraq
97
United Arab Emirate's
95
Kuwait
Iran
93
72
Venezuela
Other nations with significant reserves, in billions of barrels:
48
Russia
40
Mexico
United States

28

27
Libya
China
22
19
Nigeria
10
Norway
Algeria
9
8
Canada
5
Angola
5
Oman
5
Indonesia
The following tables provide a better understanding of the oil
and gas reserves as well as the export routes that are available
in
6
the Caspian region that are available at the present time:

6. United States Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region,
8-10 (Oct. 1998). [URL: http://www.eia.doc.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.htmi.]
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Table 1. Oil and Gas Reserves in the Caspian Region
Proven Oil
Reserves

Possible

Total Oil

Proven Gas

Possible

Total Gas

Oil

Reserves

Reserves

Gas

Reserves

Reserves
Azerbaijan

3.6-11.0

lran*
Kazakstan

Reserves

27 BBL

31-38 BBL'

II Tcf

35 Tcf

46 Tcf

0 BBL

12 BBL

12 BBL

0 Tcf

I1 Tcf

1I Tcf

10.0-16.0

85 BBL

94-101 BBL

53-83Tcf

88Tcf

141-171

BBL

BBL

Tcf

Russia*

0.2 BBL

5 BBL

5 BBL

N/A

N/A

N/A

Turk-

1.4-1.5 BBL

32 BBL

34 BBL

98-115 Tcf

159 Tcf

257-314

menistan
Uzbekistan

Tcf
0.2-0/3 BBL

I BBL

I BBL

74-88 Tcf

35 Tcf

109-123
Tcf

Total

15.4-29.0

163 BBL

BB:
* nly the. reo, nnc nenr the Cninnn nre include~d

BBL = billion barrels, Tcf = trillion cubic feet

178-191

236-337

BBL

Tcf

328 Tcf

564-665
Tcf
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Table 2. Caspian Sea Region Oil Production and Exports
Production (1990)

Production (1996)

Exports (1990)

Exports (1996)

Azerbaijan

259.3

198.7

76.8

42.6

Kazakstan

602.1

532.1

109.2

254.5

Turkmenistan

124.8

103.9

69.0

26.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Iran*
Russia**
Total

62.0

52.0

0.0

0.0

1134.4

1069.3

86.9

327.3

* only the regions near the Caspian are included
**includes these regions bordering the Caspian Sea: Astrakhan, Kalmyk Republic, Dagestan, and
Stavropol Kray

Table 3. Caspian Sea Region Natural Gas Production and Exports
(billion cubic feet/year)
Production (1990)

Production (1996)

Exports (1990)

Exports (1996)

Azerbaijan

349.6

222.5

-271.9

0.0

Kazakstan

251.2

149.8

-257.0

-114.4

Turkmenistan

3099.5

1243.1

2539.0

865.2

Uzbekistan

1439.5

1730.4

102.5

91.7

Iran*
Russia*
Total

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

5139.8

3345.8

2112.6

845.5
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Table 4. Oil Export Routes in the Caspian Sea Region
Route

Crude
Capacity

Length

Investment

'Status

AIOC-Main

multiple routes
considered
from Bakus
(Azerbaijan)

I million
barrels/day

1100 miles if
to Ceyhan,
Turkey

$3.3 billion if
to Ceyhan,
turkey

Final Route
Selection

AIOC-Early
Oil Western
Route

Baku
(Azerbaijan)Supsa
(Georgia)

0.1 million
barrels/day

550 miles

$290 million

Exports begin
late 1998

AIOC-Early
Oil Northern
Route

Baku
(Azerbaijan)Novorossisk
(Russia) via
chechnya

0.1 million
barrels/day

868 miles; 90
miles are in
Chechnya

$2.4 billion
repairs to
Chechen line

Exports begin
late 1997early 1998

Northern
Route-Early
Oil Chechnya
bypass

Azerbaijan/
Russian
borderTerskoye
(Russia) via
Dagestan

N/A

176 miles

$220 million

Announced
9/97; tender
planned

Caspian
Pipeline
Consortium

Tengiz
(Kazakstan)Novorossisk
(Russia)

1.34 million
barrels/day
peak

930 milesx

$2.2 billion

Flows 1999;
peak early
next decade

Cross-Caspian

Tengiz-Baku
or
TurkmenbashiBaku

0.4-0.5
million
barrels/day

underwater
370 miles or
190 miles

$2.5-$3.0
billion

Feasibility
Study

KazakstanChina
(may extend
to
Turkmenistan
& Uzbekistan

Aktyubinsk
(Kazakstan)Xingiang
(China)

0.4 million
barrels/day,
rising to 0.8
million
barrels/day

1,800 miles

$3.5 billion

Signed
Agreement

Turkmenista
nAfghanistanPakistan
(may extend
to Uzbekistan)

Charjou(Turkmenistan)Gwardar
(Pakistan)

1 million
barrels/day

1,000 miles

$2.5 billion

Memorandum
Understanding
for this
Central Asia
Oil Pipeline
Segment

Turkmenista
n-Persian Gulf
(may extend
to Kazakstan)

Turkmenbashi
(Turkmenistan
)-Kharg Island
(Iran)

0.2-0.4
million
barrels/day

930 miles

$1.5 billion

Proposed
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Table 5. Natural Gas Export Routes in the Caspian Sea Region
Route

Gas Capacity

Length

Investment

Status

Cross-Caspian

(Turkmenbashi)
(Turkmenistan)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Proposed

TurkmenistanUzbekistanKazakstanRussia-Europe

multiple routes
considered from
Turkmenbashi
(Turkmenistan)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Proposed
expansion of
existing
system

TurkmenistanIran

Ekarem
(Turkmenistan)Iranian border

283 billion
cubic
feet/year
2005; 530
billion cubic
feet/year
2020

90 miles

$190 million

Exports begin
late 1997early 1998

TurkmenistanIran-Turkey

Ekarem
(TurkmenistanTabriz (Iran)Ankara
(Turkey)

I trillion
cubmic
feet/year

1,350 miles

$3.1-$3.8
billion

Signed
agreement for
exports

TurkmenistanUzbekistanKazakstanChina-Japan

Dauletad Field
(Turkmenistan)Xingiang
(China)-Japan

0.7-1 trillion
cubic
feet/year

3,800 miles
China; 5,000
miles Japan

$12 billion
China; $23
billion Japan

Preliminary
feasibility
study

TurkmenistanAfghanistanPakistan
(may extend to
Uzbekistan)

Dauletad or
Yashlar Fields
(Turkmenistan)Sui (Pakistan)

700 billion
cubic
feet/year

900 miles

$2-$2.5 billion

Memorandum
Understanding
with the 3
countries &
Uzbekistan

LARGEST
FIELDS

Tnegiz
Kazakhstan

BP Amoco-led
Baku Field
Azerbaijan

Karachagnak
Kazakhstan
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RESERVES

Oil

Oil

Oil

Gas

9-13.5 billion

4.5 billion

2 billion barrels

20 trillion cubic

barrels of oil
PRODUCTIO
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200,000 barrels

barrels
115,000 barrels

feet
50,000 barrels

N PER DAY

300 million
cubic feet

Current
Potential

NUMBER OF

800,00 to 1

700,000 to

250,000 to

2.5to 3 billion

million barrels

900,00 barrels

350,000 barrels

cubic feet

00S

000

FOREIGN

oooo

PARTNERS

0000

000
0

This resource potential is leading to an exacerbation of oil related
politics which, in turn, may create certain international legal and
environmental problems including the following: (1) how does one
determine the jurisdiction over this area; (2) how will the
choosing of pipeline routes interfere with navigation of ships
through the Black Sea and the Bosporus Strait; (3) how will
international boundary problems interfere with the fragile
ecosystem in the Caspian and surrounding regions; and (4) how
will the 1982 Convention assist States in reaching a consensus on
how to proceed in that geographic area?
Historically, the U.S.S.R. and Persia (Iran) entered into a
treaty on February 26, 1921. 7 One commentator (Iranian) has
stated that:
"The Caspian Sea has always had a sui generis legal status.
The sea is linked to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea through
constructed canals via the Volga and Don rivers. According to

international law, it is not considered a high sea and navigation

7.

S. Vinogradov and P. Wouters, The Caspian Sea: Quest for a New Legal

Regime, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 87; 87-98 (1996).
The authors provide the
information in footnote 2, as follows:
The current regime is based on the Treaty between Soviet
Russia and Iran (Persia) of 26 February 1921, see 1959
Documentary Vnesbney Politiski SSSR (Documents of the
Foreign Policy of the USSR) 536; and the Treaty of Commerce

and Navigation between the Soviet Union and Iran of 25
March 1940, see Sbornak Desitvouyuschikh Dogovorov,
Soglasheniy
i
Konventiy,
Zaklyuchyomakh
SSSR
Inostrannymi Gosoudarstvami
(Collection of Treaties,
Agreements, and Conventions, Concluded by the USSR With
Foreign States) 56 (1955). Id. at 87.
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is exclusive to the neighboring countries. Accordingly, current
regulations of the international law on the high seas and the
naval zones do not apply to it ......

Another commentator has noted that, "In letters attached to
the 1940 treaty, the Caspian Sea was reportedly referred to as the
Iran-Soviet Sea, '

8

and "... there is no specific legal concept and

definable border that can fully answer the question of sovereignty
over this sea ....

"9

It is apparent that each country is currently making unilateral
declarations in order to further their interests. The problem is
that each of the divergent views can find a viable argument in
international law with the assistance of stretching various
principles. When one compounds this problem with the fact that
there is no consensus on the current legal status of the Caspian,
extensive bargaining will be necessary to arrive at an agreement.
During 1998, there were unilateral declarations regarding
jurisdiction, by various countries surrounding the Caspian. For
example, a foreign ministry press release of Azerbaijan indicated
that a protocol was signed based on Azerbaijani-Russian
consultations on issues relating
to the legal status of the Caspian.
10
part:
in
stated,
The protocol
"Azerbaijani-Russian consultations on issues relating to the
legal status of the Caspian Sea took place in Baku on 27th
March 1998.
The sides pointed with satisfaction to the perceptible turn
toward the littoral states moving closer together on issues
relating to the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
During the consultations the sides expressed the opinion that
the division of the bed of the Caspian Sea as an element in its
legal status could help all the Caspian littoral states reach a
consensus on a convention other legal status of the Caspian.
The sides agreed that the division of the bed of the Caspian
Sea into sectoral zones be carried out in line with an
8.

Mohammed-Reza Dabiri, A New Approach to the Legal Regime of the

Caspian Sea as a Basis for Peace and Development, 6 IRANIAN J. INT'L AFFAIRS

28, 32 (1994).
9. Dabiri, supra note 8, at 33.
10. 'Bakinskiy Rabochiy', Azeri-Russian Protocol on Division of Caspian,
1998 British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Part 1, former USSR; Georgia; SU/D3191/F, Apr. 2, 1998.
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agreement between the relevant contiguous and opposite
states on the basis of the principle of equidistant points (the
median line) and other universally recognized principles of
international law, and also taking into account the established
practice in the Caspian.
The sides agreed that as a result of such a division into zonal
sectors, each of the littoral states is recognized as having
exclusive rights to the mineral resources of the bed of the
Caspian Sea.
The sides agreed to continue consultations and negotiations on
the legal status of the Caspian Sea, including discussion of
issues such as preserving for common use the surface of the
Caspian Sea and the depths of the water in order to ensure
freedom of shipping, observance of uniform standards for
fishing and environmental conservation."
This declaration took place in 1998. On January 31, 1999, it
was reported that the Azerbaijani government had suggested that
the United States open a military base there. 11 No formal request
was made but it may be a topic of discussion when President
Heydyas Aliyeu visits Washington later in 1999. In fact, on
November 18, 1999, at a ceremony in Istanbul, Turkey, together
with the Presidents of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkey, President Clinton agreed to support the building of a
pipeline that would carry oil from the Caspian Sea to ports in the
west on route that would not pass through Russia or Iran. 12 Of
course, Russia "... considers the Caucasus region, all of which was

part of the Soviet Union, as its sphere of influence. It has troops
in both Armenia and Georgia and resents Azerbaijan's
unwillingness to accept them. Russian leaders are also seeking to
persuade Azerbaijan to export the bulk of its oil through a
pipeline across Russian territory, rather than choosing a route
across Turkey that is favored by the United States .... ." Currently,
the largest contingent of American soldiers in the region are in
Incirlik, southern Turkey. 13 Iran has objected to any military base

11. Stephen Kinzer, Azerbaijan Asks the U.S. to Establish Military Base, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at 11.
12. Kinzer, Summit in Turkey: The Caspian Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1999 at 12.
13. Id. at 11.

2000]

THE CASPIAN

of the United States in Azerbaijan. According to Foreign Minister
14
Kama Kharrazi, said base would not be tolerated.
Other so called arrangements include inter alia, a joint
statement by 15
Russia and Iran regarding the legal status as they
would have it:
"Russia and Iran have signed a joint statement on the legal
status of the Caspian Sea and its development by littoral states,
an official at the Russian Foreign Ministry said."
"The parties considered several options for the use of the
Caspian Sea by the littoral states," the official said.
"The first one involves the division of the Caspian seabed
without the division of the sea's surface or waters. The second
one envisages the division of both the seabed and the waters.
And the third one involves the joint use of the seabed's
reserves and the waters by all littoral states," the official
added."
He indicated that Iran agreed in principle on the possible
division of the Caspian seabed among all the states.
"Iran said a possible division of the seabed should be carried
out fairly by all the states, but did not specify how the midline
would be defined," the official said, adding Iran claimed the
division of the seabed into equal sectors.
He also said Russia and Iran still have disagreements on
certain problems related to the development of the Caspian
Sea's oil and gas reserves.
"The parties agreed to continue consultations on this issue," he
said.
Earlier this month, Russia and Kazakstan signed a protocol
on the division of the northern part of the Caspian Sea, which
had been opposed by Iran and Turkmenistan..

14. Reuters Service, Iran: Plan for U.S. Base Protested, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 9,
1999, at A8.
15. Maria Zabralova, Russia, Iran Sign Caspian Sea Accord, Journal of
Commerce, Sect.: Commodities/Chemicals/Energy, July 22, 1998, at 8A.
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With regard to the so-called "legal status" of the Caspian, the
littoral States have, from the beginning of their recognition of the
oil and gas potential of the region and the breakup of the Soviet
Union block countries, disputed "ownership" of the vast resource
under the Caspian. One newspaper article has summarized
earlier 1legal
stances of the country toward "legal status" as
6
follows:
There even is a dispute over which country owns the oil. under
the water. The Caspian is a large inland sea, some 200 miles
across. Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan say it is a
lake and its underwater resources can be split by simply
drawing straight lines out from the borders of the littoral
nations until they meet. Iran and Russia say it is an ocean and
each bordering nation owns the oil out to the 40 mile limit:
after that, they say, the resources in the vast middle area of the
Caspian must be shared.
If the Caspian is a lake, Russia and Iran control relatively little
of it. If it is an ocean, they control much more. The issue is
unsettled. No negotiations are going on, but at least the
Russian dispute might be settled on a de facto basis with
Azerbaijan authorizing wells in the disputed regions by
Western oil companies that would buy off Moscow by giving a
piece of the deal to Lukoil or other Russian firms.
As will be discussed throughout this article, the issue of
whether the Caspian is a sea, lake, ocean, or has some other status,
is an unnecessary venture into metaphysics.
There is no question that a regional (not unilateral ) response
by the various States in that area will be necessary in order to
preserve order, maintain the, environment and freedom of
navigation.
It is necessary to turn our attention first to the geography of
the Caspian. This subject can be broken down into descriptions of
the physical environment, biological resources, socio-economic
features, environmental problems regarding pollution, and
concern over the rise of the sea level of the Caspian. Thereafter,
the article will explore the existing legal framework contained in
the 1982 Convention. 17
The geography of the area is

16. R.C. Longworth, Thirsty U.S. Wading Into Oil Tar Pit.: Destitute Plum of
Caspian has Many Suitors, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 9, 1998 at 1.

17.

Convention, supra note 3.
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uncontentious. It is necessary to set forth the geography in order
to understand the problems raised in this article.
II.
A.

18
The Geography of the Caspian

The Physical Environment

The sheer size of the Caspian is impressive. It is the world's
largest inland body of water as it contains 44% of the volume of
all inland lakes and seas. It has no natural connection to the

oceans of the world and, at its current level, (-26.5m below MSL)
its coastline is approximately 7,000 km in length, with a surface
area of 386,400 km2 and a water volume of about 78,700 km.
Approximately 130 large and small rivers flow into the Caspian,
e.g., the Volga. The five largest rivers (i.e., Volga, Kura, Tereck,

Ural and Sulak) supply over ninety percent of the incoming
freshwater. The Caspian's average salinity rate is just over onethird that of seawater. As will be alluded to later in this article,
the most interesting physical characteristic of the Caspian from
the human point of view is the continuous fluctuation in its surface
level. 19
18. The World Bank, Caspian Environmental Program, Republic of
Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Kazakhstan, Russian
Federation. Turkmenistan, Annex I (May 3, 1998) (unpublished concept paper).
All of the geographic material of the Caspian Sea in this article was taken from
Annex I.
19. Id. at 1-2. The full text states, as follows:
"ANNEX I - The Caspian Environment
a) Physical environment
1. The Caspian Sea, called the jewel of two continents, Asia
and Europe, is the worlds largest inland body of water,
encompassing some 44% of the volume of all inland lakes
and seas.
The Caspian occupies a deep continental
depression within the largest catchment basin in Europe
(about 3,100,000 km2). It is approximately 1,030km long
and its width ranges from 435km to a minimum of 196km.
It has no natural connection to the worlds oceans and its
surface level is currently around -26.5m below MSL. At
this level, its total coastline is some 7,000km in length, its
surface area 386,400km2 and its water volume about
78,700km3.
2. The Caspian can be divided into three parts: the northern,
middle and southern. The border between the northern
and middle parts runs along the edge of the North Caspian
shelf between Chechen island (near the Terek river mouth)
and Cape Tiub-Karagan (at Fort Shevchenko). The border
between the middle and southern parts runs from the
Apsheron threshold connecting Zhiloi Island in the west
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4.

5.
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with Cape Kuuli in the east (north of Turkmenistan). The
northern part covers about 25% of the total surface area,
while the middle and southern parts cover about 37% each.
However, water volumes in the northern part account for a
mere 0.5%, volumes in the middle part make up 33.9%,
while the southern part contains 65.6% of the Caspian
waters. These volumes are a reflection of the bathymetry
of the Caspian: the northern part is very shallow, being
mainly less than 5m in depth; in the middle part, the main
feature is the Derbent Depression, which reaches depths
over 500m; and the southern part comprises the South
Caspian Depression, with its deepest point being 1025m
below the surface.
Around 130 large and small rivers flow into the Caspian,
nearly all of which flow into the north or west coasts. The
largest is the Volga River, which drains an area of
1,400,000km2 into the northern part of the Caspian. Over
90% of the inflowing freshwater is supplied by the 5 largest
rivers: Volga, Kura, Terek, Ural and Sulak. The rest is
accounted for by the Iranian rivers and the smaller streams
on the western shores, since there are no permanent
inflows on the eastern side. The Volga water is fresh (total
ionic content from 200 to 400 mg/l), and enters the Caspian
through the west part of the delta, flowing south along the
west coast. Because the Caspian is so shallow there, no
saline stratification can become established. The Volga
and Caspian waters mix rapidly, causing a marked increase
in salinity as on moves away from the delta. The Caspian's
average salinity is slightly over 1/3 that of seawater, such
that it may be classified as brackish and mesohaline, a
rather unique hydrochemical environment.
Apart from the extensive shallows of the northern part, the
other two physical features that characterize the Caspian
are the delta of the Volga and the Kara Bogaz Gol gulf.
The Volga Delta covers about 10,000km5 and the apron
has a width of about 200km. A feature of the delta region
are the so-called Baer knolls, which are hillocks between 320m in height, formed by the action of onshore winds on
the river sediments that are discharged into the delta at a
rate of 8 million tonnes per year. Numerous small lakes are
found between the knolls, and there is a complex system of
channels with many islets. The Volga-Caspian shipping
canal traverses the delta, and is dredged to a minimum 2m
depth.
The Kara Bogaz Gol is situated on the eastern coast of the
Caspian and comprises a shallow depression with a surface
area of about 18,000km5, annual precipitation between 75100mm and over 1,000mm evaporation per year. As a
result, under natural conditions, water flows from the main
Caspian into the Gol at a rate of about 18-25km; per year.
This significant volume of water moves through a 8km long
channel at speeds of 50-100cmsec and influences water
levels of the Caspian by about 6-8cm. In 1980, in an
attempt to stem the impact of dropping water levels, the
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B. Biological Resources
Because of its long existence and its isolation the biodiversity
of the Caspian aquatic environment has allowed ample conditions
for speciation.
There are over 400 endemic aquatic taxa; 115 species of fish
(some of which are anadromous and migrate from the Caspian up
the rivers to spawn). The best known are the seven species and
subspecies of sturgeon, and the Caspian freshwater seal (one of
the two species in the world, the other being found in Lake
Baikal).
Coastal wetlands attract a variety of birds; territorial flora
and fauna are 2 0quite diverse and include several thousand
flowering plants.
channel was blocked by a permanent dam and the Gol lost
its supply of Caspian water. Its volume shrank immediately
and its physical characteristics changed.
Some water
(around 2km;) has been allowed to flow into the Gol again
since 1984, and more recently a full and free flow has been
restored.
7. The most salient physical characteristic of the Caspian from
the human point of view is the continuous fluctuation in its
surface level. Modern observations began in 1830, and for
the next 100 years the water level was recorded as
fluctuating within a range of 1.0m with a mean level of 25.83m below MSL. In 1930 the level began to fall
abruptly, and by 1941 it had gone down 1.9m. The
dropping level continued to the mid-1950s, and stabilized in
the late 1950s and 1960s, probably as a result of the major
reservoirs that were built then on the Volga, and an
increase in the amount of water drawn for irrigation.
Without this draw-off, the Caspian waters would probably
have started to rise again. But by 1977, the levels went
down to the lowest reached over the past 500 years of so, 29.0m. However, from 1978 the trend was suddenly
reversed, and the levels started rising again. By 1993 it had
reached -27.0m, that is, it had gone up 2.Om in 15 years. In
1995, Caspian water levels stood around -26.5m and were
still rising.
8. The long term changes in Caspian water level have a
complex character and have aroused great interest in
scientific and economic quarters. The calculation of longterm forecasts of water level is not thought reliable, and it
seems more expedient to plan for a further rise in water
level, bearing in mind the levels that prevailed in the early
1900s."
20. The World Bank, supra, note 19, at 2, 3. The full text states, as follows:
"b) Biological resources
i.
The Caspian region lies in the center of the Paleoarctic
zoogeographical realm and is comprised of two major biomes
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C. Socio-Economic Features

The Caspian basin and the Ural mountain chain constitute
the boundary between Europe and Asia. Historically, there were

ancient caravan routes such as the Great Silk Road. The current
population around the Caspian is about 5 million.

J.

k.

Baku, the

- cold, continental deserts and semi-deserts in the north and
east, and warmer mixed mountain and highland systems with
complex zonation in the south-west and south. There is also a
small area around the Volga Delta in the west where the
temperate grasslands biome is represented. Caspian living
resources reflect the range of climatic conditions that prevail
around its perimeter, resulting in a significant degree of
biological diversity. This is further enhanced by the existence
of extensive wetland systems such as the deltas of the Volga,
the Ural and the Kura rivers, and the hyper saline Kara Bogaz
Gol.
The biodiversity of the Caspian aquatic environment is
derived from the long history of the existence of the sea and
its isolation, allowing ample conditions for speciation. The
number of endemic aquatic taxa, over 400, is very impressive.
There are 115 species of fish, of which a number are
anadromous and migrate from the Caspian up the rivers to
spawn. The best known of these are the seven species and
subspecies of sturgeon, which have provided a valuable
economic resource for over a century. There is also a Caspian
freshwater seal, one of only two species that occur worldwide,
with the other one found in Lake Baikal.
recently noticed phenomenon that could lead to the potential
loss of diversity among the sturgeon species is the
hybridization that has occurred between sturgeon from the
Black Sea and those in the Caspian Sea. This has come about
through the connection now possible via the Don-Volga
Canal. The canal also permits the accidental introduction of
exotic species from the Black Sea and, via ballast water
discharge, from the world's waters. While its precise effects
are currently hard to evaluate, it is a cause of serious concern.
Coastal wetlands attract a variety of birds that are prolific
throughout the year in and around the Caspian, with their
numbers swelling enormously during the migration seasons
when many species visit the extensive deltas, shallows and
other wetlands. It is at these times that ecologically-motivated
visitors could be guided into carefully selected vantage points
and allowed to experience the beauty and the bounty of
protected ecological resources. Such ecotourism, carefully
planned and managed, has tremendous potential both as an
income earner and as an excellent mechanism to educate and
inform the interested public, whether they are local or foreign
visitors. Terrestrial flora and fauna are quite diverse as well,
and include several thousand flowering plants, with a rate of
endemicity locally reaching 20%. A similar range of diversity
is seen among insects, reptiles, birds and mammals."
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largest city on the Caspian coast, has a 1.7 million population. The
rest of the populous along the basin resides in towns or cities
ranging in size from 20,000 to 670,000 with about one million rural
inhabitants. In 1995 the annual GNP per capita was, as follows:
Azerbaijan, US $1240.00; Iran US, $2410.00; Kazakhstan, US
$2030.00; Russia, US $3470.00; Turkmenistan, US$1440.00. The
principal economic activities are fisheries, agriculture, petroleum
production and related downstream industries. The Caspian
contains over eighty percent of the world's sturgeon stock as well
as substantial stocks of other commercially valuable species.
Revenues to the littoral States from sturgeon, including caviar, are
thought to be six billion dollars annually.
Rich vegetable
cultivation, cattle and sheep husbandry are prime agricultural
activities as well as oil exploration which is increasing substantially
with several western companies and consortia biddinf for
concessions. This, in turn, leads to environmental problems.

21.

The World Bank, supra note 19, at 3. The full text states, as follows:
c) Socio-economic features
13. The Caspian basin, together with the Ural Mountain chain, is
considered the boundary between Europe and Asia and has
seen centuries of commerce along ancient caravan routes
such as the Great Silk Road. The current total population
around the Caspian is estimated at about 5 million, with the
main urban centers concentrated on the western and
southern shores. In the west, Baku is the largest city on the
Caspian coast, with a population of 1.7 million. The balance
of the Caspian basin population resides in cities or towns
ranging in size from 20,000 to 670,000, plus about 1,000,000
rural inhabits. In 1995, the annual GNP per capita was as
follows:
Azerbaijan
US$1240.00;
Iran
US$2410.00;
Kazakhstan US$2030.00; Russia US$3470.00; Turkmenistan
US$1440.00. As such, all Caspian countries qualify for GEF
assistance.
14. The principal economic activities in the Caspian basin are
fisheries, agriculture, petroleum production and related
downstream industries. The sea contains over 80% of the
world's sturgeon stock as well as substantial stocks of other
commercially valuable species. Revenues to the littoral
countries from sturgeon, including caviar, are thought to total
US$6 billion annually. Rice and vegetable cultivation and
cattle and sheep husbandry are the prime agricultural
activities in the catchment area.
Oil exploration and
production are increasing along the northern and eastern
shelves of the Caspian and are already well established in the
Baku and Tenghiz regions. Oil production is expected to
increase substantially over the next few years, with several
western companies and consortia bidding for concessions.
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D. Environmental Challenges

Sea level rise has been the leading environmental problem.
The challenges with regard to sea level rise include alleviating

human suffering, protecting valuable infrastructure and
preventing pollution incidents. Problems due to human activity
and in the22catchments of rivers draining into the Caspian are
significant.
1.

Pollution-The ecological integrity of the Caspian is

under significant threat from pollution by particulate organic
master and excess inorganic nutrients (eutrophication); by various
toxic materials, (radio nuclides, heavy metals, pesticide residues,
persistent synthetic organic compounds such as phenols, PCB's,

dioxins) with the Volga being the single major source as it drains
the sewage of half the population of Russia and most of its heavy
industry into the Caspian. Large quantifies of toxic waste run-off
and spills have been generated by on-shore
and off-shore oil fields
23
refineries and petrochemical plants.

22. The World Bank, supra,note 18, at 3-4. The full text states, as follows:
Environmental Challenges
15. During the Joint Mission and in other consultations, the
Caspian governments repeatedly emphasized the primacy of
the impacts of sea level rise as the leading environmental
problem facing them. While response to the environmental
impacts of sea level rise may well be considered the most
urgent in terms of alleviating human suffering, protecting
valuable infrastructure and preventing pollution incidents,
other types and sources of environmental problems must also
be considered in a comprehensive environmental program
for the region. The Caspian Sea Environment Program seeks
to address environmental problems due to human activity in
or near the Sea and in the catchments of rivers draining into
the Caspian, as well as problems caused by fluctuations in
water levels. The measures to address these problems will be
most successful if they combine long term, integrated and
strategic approaches with short term emergency responses."
23. The World Bank, supra, note 18, at 4. The full text states, as follows:
a) Pollution
16. The ecological integrity of the Caspian is under significant
threat from pollution by particulate organic matter and
excess inorganic nutrients (eutrophication) and by various
toxic materials (radionuclides, heavy metals, pesticide
residues, and persistent synthetic organic compounds such as
phenols, PCB's and dioxins).
As in other countries
undergoing similar profound economic change, the economic
decline that accompanied the dissolution of the former Soviet
Union substantially reduced contaminant loading to the
Caspian. However, as economic activity picks up, previous
discharge and nonpoint source contamination levels can be
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2.
Biodiversity and Depletion of Bio-Resources- There is an
urgent need to address contamination by waste products of human
activities (heavy industry, agriculture, weapons development,
power generation, etc.). For example, the sturgeon fishing industry
has been dramatically affected. This resource is best known to the
reader because of the value of caviar and fish, however, there has
been a drastic decline in the sturgeon catch:
..

*. Landings have decreased from around 30,000 tonnes in

1985 to 13,3000 tonnes in 1990, down to 2,100 tonnes in 1994.
A quota system that was introduced together with a ban on
pelagic fishing does not seem to have had the desired effect.
expected to resume. The potential impact of a changing
industrial profile should also be examined in order to
understand how future degradation patterns may differ from
those of the past.
17. Except for oil products from oil fields or transportation by
ship or pipeline, all other sources of pollution that are
quantitatively important are well localized point sources.
The Volga is beyond doubt the single major source: it drains
the sewage of half the population of Russia, and of most its
heavy industry. Much of the Volga pollution is broken down
en route, or deposited on the bottoms of the Volga
reservoirs, but sufficient amounts still reach the Caspian to
cause major imbalances, especially in the shallow north basin,
which has limited absorption capacity. While the Volga is a
point source for the Caspian, it is itself a complex mix of
point and non-point sources along its course. Coordination
between the CSEP and the Upper and Middle Volga
Components

of

the

World

Bank-funded

Russian

Environmental Management Project should be pursued as
feasible and useful.
18. Major land-base point sources of pollution are oil extraction
and refining complexes in Baku and Sumgait (Azerbaijan),
the site of a century of oil production and environmental
neglect, and radioactive solid and liquid waste deposits near
the Gurevskaya nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan. The
Sumgait industrial area, currently operating at only a fraction
of capacity, and been partly constructed in a flood-prone
zone. Large quantities of toxic waste run-off and spills have

been generated by on-shore and off-shore oil fields,
refineries and petrochemical plants.

The shorelines and

near-shore waters are heavily polluted in many areas, most
prominently in Baku Bay.
19. The Gurevskaya nuclear power plant, which generates both
power and desalinated drinking water, has been constructed
sufficiently above sea level not to be immediately threatened
by flooding. However, solid and liquid radioactive waste has
been dumped in a number of depressions over karstic
formations, which may be leaking radioactivity via the
subsurface. Hard data on this problem are lacking.
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While fishing methods have become more efficient and
overfishing has occurred, the greatest impact on the sturgeon
and other anadromous species is thought to arise from the
construction of numerous dams on the Volga river, and to a
lesser extent on the Dura river. These dams have effectively
barred the fish from their main spawning grounds, reducing
such areas to a small fraction of their previous size. In
addition, the development of industrial complexes on the river
banks with their subsequent discharges, coupled with nonpoint source run-off from intensive a~riculture, have led to
pollution of the remaining waterways."
The Caspian basin is also rich in hydrocarbon deposits, with
proven extensive reserves of oil and gas.
This production
increases the risks to aquatic resources, in part, due to the
constant shipping traffic generated. In addition to the oil industry
transport there must be added the fishing fleets of each country as
well as cargo and passenger traffic that crosses the Caspian in
order to reach the Volga-Don Canal and the Black Sea.
The water level fluctuations have caused problems:
The lowest level for the last five hundred years was reached in
1977 (-29m below sea level); therefore, it is a fair assumption
that the level could continue to rise from the current level (26m) until it reaches at least the 1900 level (-25m), presenting
the littoral states with many urgent investment needs. In less
than two decades, water levels have risen two and a half
meters, inundating residential areas, transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure, chemical and
petrochemical industries, croplands and hatcheries. Thousands
of residents have been evacuated from flooded homes, and up
to 100,000 people in coastal cities and towns in Azerbaijan
alone have been affected by the spread of toxic wastes,
contamination of water supplies, loss of25infrastructure, and
inundation of workplaces and settlements.
The problems associated with the changing sea level generally
fall into two main categories:
i) those that are exacerbated by the rising water, such as the
spread of toxic contaminants into ground and surface waters, the
collapse of vital fisheries due to the loss of natural and artificial
hatcheries, and increased pressure on fragile lands because of
displaced activities and communities; and

24.
25.

The World Bank, supra,note 18, at 4.
Id. at 5.
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ii) those that are caused by changing water levels, such as
residential flooding, saltwater intrusion into freshwater aquifers
and the submersion of productive
infrastructure (coastal factories,
26
farms, roads, railways, etc.)
Against, this background, let us now review the provisions of
the 1982 Convention that are applicable to our discussion. First,
we will have an introductory sketch of the applicable law of the
sea terms that will be utilized throughout this article. Then, we
will turn to the jurisdictional provisions that are at the forefront of
the sea-lake-ocean dispute.
III. Basic Law of the Terminology
A.

A JurisdictionalSchematic

During the course of this article, there are law of the sea
terms that will need to be understood by the reader. The
following is a schematic jurisdictional diagram which has been
drawn for the purpose of introductory analysis:
Normally, the coastal state exercises the utmost jurisdiction
over its land territory. Every coastal state has a baseline 27 which is
used to measure the state's diminishing jurisdiction as one moves
seaward. The coastal state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its
Facbsive Etmmic Zone
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26. The World Bank, supra note 18, at 6.
27. Convention, supra note 3. The 1982 Convention defines "baseline" as
follows: "Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is a low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal
state." Id. at art. 5.
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ports and harbors (with possible access to visiting ships). As one
moves seaward from the baseline, the state exercises almost total
jurisdiction over its territorial sea 28 (except for the doctrine of
innocent passage 29 ) which is measured twelve miles seaward from
its baseline. The coastal State's jurisdiction diminishes further
when the contiguous zone, 30 which extends for twelve miles

28. Convention, supra note 3, The scope of the "territorial sea" is defined by
Article 3 and 4 of the 1982 Convention. "Every State has the right to establish
the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles,
measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." Id at
art. 3. "The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a
distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the
territorial sea." Id. at art. 4.
29. Convention, supra note 3, art. 19. "Innocent passage" is defined by the
1982 Convention at Article 19 as follows:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall
take place in conformity with this Convention and with other
rules of international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial
to the peace, good order for security of the coastal State if in
the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:
a.
any treat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations;
any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security
of the coastal State;
any act of progaganda amime at affecting the defense or security of the coastal
State;
the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
any fishing activities;
the carrying out of research or survey activities;
any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State;
any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Id. at art. 19.
30. Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. "Contiguous zone" is defined by the
1982 Convention at Article 33 as follows:
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the
contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to:
a. Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
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The
beyond the territorial waters reaches the high seas.
contiguous zone is a limited area of jurisdiction of the coastal state

(e.g., navigation, sanitation, customs, fiscal) and is actually part of
the high seas. 31 The high seas areas are open to all nations and

therefore the coastal State is not allowed to exercise its
jurisdiction in this area (with limited exceptions, e.g., the exclusive
economic zone).32
territorial sea;
punish infringement of the above laws and regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea;
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles
form the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.
Id. at art. 33.
31. Convention, supra note 3, art. 55.
The term "high seas" is open to at least two interpretations. The Convention
defines it as, "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." Id. at 86. Defining the exclusive
economic zone introduces new variables to the high seas analysis, however. As
set forth by P.W. Birnie:
Although Article 58 states that in the EEZ [Exclusive
Economic Zone] all states continue to enjoy the freedoms of
navigation and overflight and "other internationally lawful
uses of the sea related to them, such as those associated with
the operation of ships' and aircraft, it also makes these rights
subject to the relevant provisions of the Convention" without
making it clear which are the "relevant provisions" or which
take priority. Article 86 adds that the article" does not entail
any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States" in the
EEZ under Article 58, which itself also adds that "Articles 88
to 115... apply to the exclusive economic zone so far as they
are not incompatible with this Part" but coastal states may
consider that as the zone's purpose is to secure their exclusive
right to its economic uses and as its legal status is arguably left
sui generis by the wording of the UNCLOS since it is not
clearly stated to be part of the high seas, it is their
responsibility to protect navigation from piratical assaults; the
better view, however, would be that as the zone is by its terms
not part of the territorial sea the piracy articles apply in it.
States taking the other line might also argue, however, that
piracy is an unlawful use outwith [sic] the residual rights of
other states.
P.W. Birnie, Piracy-Past,Present and Future, Piracy at Sea 131, 141 (Eric Ellen
ed., 1989) (citations omitted). The UNCLOS Drafting Committee has not
resolved these ambiguities satisfactorily.
32. Convention, supra note 3, art. 55. The concept of the "exclusive
economic zone" is defined by the 1982 Convention at Article 55, as follows:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent
to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime
established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction
b.
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The high seas have been traditionally open to all nations for
the purpose of preserving international shipping and commerce.
International straits are also preserved for international commerce
and are therefore open to all nations. 33 The flow of international

of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States
are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
Id. at art. 55.
Article 56 of the 1982 Convention governs the rights, jurisdiction and duties of
the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed
and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;
b) as provided for in the relevant ovisions of this Convention
with regard to:
i. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures;
ii. marine scientific research;
iii. the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this
Convention in the exclusive zone, the coastal State shall have
due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall
act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed
and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with part VI.
Id. at art. 56.
Finally, Article 57 of the 1982 Convention defines the breadth of the
exclusive economic zone: "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured." Id. at art. 57.
33. Convention, supra note 3, art. 34. Article 34 of the 1982 Convention
governs the legal status of waters forming straits used for international purposes:
1. The regime of passage through straits used for international
navigation established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or in
the exercise by the States bordering the straits is exercised
subject to this Part and to other rules of international law.
Id. at art. 34.
Article 37 and 38 of the 1982 Convention apply to transit passage for
international purposes. Article 37 limits transit passage to "straits which are used
for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone."
Id. at art. 37. Article 38 then defines the right of transit passage as follows:
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy
the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except
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commerce is at the heart of all major maritime conventions and
concerns regarding maritime violence. Commerce must be able to
flow freely, uninhibited, without danger to life and limb and
without fear of widespread environmental contamination.
Having reviewed elementary jurisdictional concepts regarding
Convention provisions applicable to this article, it is now
necessary to set forth the basic Convention provision that is
proving contentious.
B. The Definition of an Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Sea
The Convention defines an "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea"
as a ".. . gulf basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and
connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or
consisting entirely or primarily of the
34 territorial seas and exclusive
States.
coastal
more
or
two
zones of
The reader will notice at the outset, that part of the definition
utilizes a word that the Article is seeking to define; namely, a
"sea." This definition leads us to an important question: is there
an "outlet" to another sea or ocean? Yes. In fact, the World
Bank points out that because of this particular outlet, "...
a

that, if the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the
strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there
exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or
through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience
with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.
2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this
Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone.
However, the requirements of continuous and
expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the
strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a
State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions to entry to
that State. Id. at art. 38.
34. Convention, supra note 3, art. 122. Article 122 states, as follows:
PART IX
ENCLOSED OR SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS
Article 122
Definition
For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semienclosed sea" means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or
more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a
narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more
coastal States.
Convention, supra, note 3, art. 122.
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recently noticed phenomenon that could lead to the potential loss
of diversity among the sturgeon species is the hybridization that
has occurred between sturgeon from the Black Sea and those in
the Caspian Sea... this has come about through the connection
now possible via the Don-Volga Canal. The canal also permits the
accidental introduction of the exotic species from the Black Sea,
via ballast waste discharge from the world's waters .... ,35
However, we have an "outlet" going in the wrong direction.
As was pointed out earlier, 130 large and small rivers flow into the
Caspian. While not meeting the exact definition of an enclosed or
semi-enclosed sea, the Article definition could easily be stretched
to cover this situation. Why bother doing this mental aerobic?
Because the next numerical convention article clearly requests
that the States bordering such an area cooperate ".... with each
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their
duties under this Convention ....,36
"Cooperation" is the key idea here. More than eighty
percent of the Caspian shoreline is shared by Azerbaijan, Russia,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan while the rest is controlled by Iran.
Littoral States should cooperate in the exercise of their rights and
in the performance of their duties. However, up until now, each
State is attempting to make the best possible deal for itself.
Does it matter whether the Caspian is a "sea" or a "lake" or
another type of geological entry? In order to answer this question,

35.
36.

The World Bank, supra, note 18, at 2-3.
Convention, supra note 3, art. 123. Article 123 states, as follows:
Article 123
Co-operation of States bordering enclosedor semi-enclosed seas
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in
the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this
end they shall endeavor, directly or through an appropriate
regional organization:
a.

conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living

b.

resources of the sea;
to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and
duties with respect to the protection and preservation of

c.

d.

the marine environment;
to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and
undertake where appropriate joint programmes of
scientific research in the area;
to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or
international organizations to co-operate with them in
furtherance of the provisions of this article. Id. at art. 123.
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let us examine the writings of commentators, as well as relevant
International Court of Justice elaborations.
IV. Is the Caspian a Sea, Lake, Ocean, Basin, or Some Other
Form of Geological Entity?
According to a recent37 article,
classification is rather difficult:

the issue

of Caspian

"The classification of the Caspian is a complicated issue. It is
defined as an "inland sea," for example. See 2NEB, supra note
2, at 612. The Food and Agriculture Organization's ("FAO")
Systematic Index also qualifies the Caspian Sea as an "inland
sea."
See FAO, Systematic Index of International Water
Resources Treaties, Declarations,Acts and Cases by Basin, in 2

LEGISLATIVE STUDY NO. 34, at 287 9184). Notably,
however, the Caspian Sea is included in the list of "Major
Lakes of the World." WATER IN CRISIS 161-65 (P.H.
Gleick Ed., 1993) (Table B.10). One expert from the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO
has asserted that "from an oceanographic point of view (coin
position of water, fauna, flora) the Caspian Sea should be
considered as a sea. In fact, the Caspian Sea is a relict marine
basins." See Minutes of the meeting on Cooperation of UN
Organizations in the Caspian Sea Initiatives 5 (Jan. 17, 1995)

(on file with the author). For a detailed analysis of the legal
issues regarding the Caspian Sea, see S. Vinogradov & P.
Wouters, The Caspian Sea: Current Legal Problems, 55
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR A USLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 604023 (1995); S.

Vinogradov & P. Wouters, The Caspian Sea: Quest for a New
Legal Regime, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1996).
Resource Journal.
The Caspian has been considered an inland sea, a major lake
as well as a relict marine basin. If it is to be considered a "sea" it
is because (a) historically, that is how it has been referred to; and
(b) oceanographically, the composition of its water, and the type
of flora and fauna, seem to indicate it is a sea. On the other hand
it has been asserted that "....

[a]s a land-locked body of water,

laying some 27 meters below the ocean level, without any direct
outlet to the ocean ....
"[footnote omitted], the Caspian is not

37. Sergei Vinogradov, Transboundary Water Resources in the FormerSoviet
Union: Between Conflict and Cooperation, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 393, 396 n.8.
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sticto sensu a sea, i.e., a part of the world ocean .... 38 As one
scholar pointed out, "[t]he sea/lake dichotomy permits a symbiotic
approach to the problem under which two sets of identifiable rules
of international law could be appealed to by the littoral states in
the regulation of the Caspian .... ,39
Normally, the approach taken by each of the concerned
States would depend on how strong each considers its position to
be viz-a-viz each
other. As late as December 18, 1998, it was
40
reported that:
"The five countries bordering the Caspian Sea failed to reach
agreement on its legal status during a meeting in Moscow ....
that Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran wanted both the
seabed and the surface divided into national sectors, while
Russia and Kazakhstan proposed dividing only the seabed,
leaving the surface free."
We should now look at a possible procedure that could be
utilized in order to create a legal regime thereby, hopefully,
stabilizing the region from the repercussion of various unilateral
claims of ownership.
V.

The Proposed Procedure to Adopt Regarding The
Exploration of the Caspian

The purpose of having a regional plan of arrangement
(creation of a new legal regime) among the States is threefold:
first, to set forth the procedure these States will utilize in order to
obtain the resources available in the Caspian; second, to set forth
a procedure that they will utilize in order to protect the nonresource rights such as navigation; and, third, because a regional
plan is needed to proceed with development/distribution and at
the same time, protect the environment.
Why?
As one
commentator stated: "The fact that the Caspian is an inland sea
and the littoral States do not have access to the open sea makes
the issue of
pipeline routes critical to the Caspian Sea oil
4
exploration:
The classification of the Caspian body of water is disputed by

38. Vinogradov and Wouters, supra note 8, at 90.
39. Id. at 91.
40. Christopher Wren, Talks on Caspian Sea Rights Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 1998 at A8.
41.
See Jon E. Chicky, The Caspian Sea Region: A Look at Future U.S. and
Allied Military Missions, Final Report, Naval War College. Feb. 13, 1998, at 2,11.
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the littoral States. This dispute is one source of the tension
between the littoral States. The Russians, Iranians, and
recently the Turkmen have classified the Caspian as a lake
whereas the Azerbaijanis and Kazaks call the Caspian an
inland sea. The classification debate is more than academic.
The debate centers on dividing the resources (while protecting
the non-resources "rights") of the Caspian. Those supporting
the lake concept say that beyond a limited territorial boundary
all littoral States must agree on the use or exploitation of
Caspian resources. Those supporting the inland sea view
believe that the Caspian should be treated like other enclosed
seas, with territorial limits and the resources beyond them
open for exploitation. According to the UN organizations,
Food and Agriculture Organization and UNESCO, the
Caspian,
from an oceanographic point of view, is an inland
,4 2
sea."

By now, the reader should be aware of the fact that it is
impossible to call the Caspian a sea or lake because an effective
argument could be made for either approach. However, it may be
irrelevant that the Caspian be labeled as one or the other because
the framework for proceeding to develop the area has been set
forth in the Convention and in a "condominium" approach taken
43
by the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Fonseca case.
A.

Case Concerningthe Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras:NicaraguaIntervening)

Before deciding on the paths that the oil pipelines will take, is
necessary to develop a legal regime or basis for developing the oil
from the Caspian. Why? Because there are other considerations
that are important, e.g., the environmental damage that could
occur if the extraction of oil is taken in a "helter-skelter" manner.
Developing this regime or plan should be quite simple once the
littoral and surrounding States realize that cooperation will be
necessary or very serious political problems will occur. Thus, we
can have planned "greed" for the "common heritage of mankind"
by utilizing a regional approach that should satisfy all of the States
that are involved. Every State could benefit and thereby bring up
the standard of living in each of the neighboring States.

42. See Chicky, supra note 42, at 2.
43. Gulf of Fonseca (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening) 1992
I.C.J. 351.
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The majority opinion of the Gulf of Fonseca provides an
interesting approach." The ICJ majority opinion decided that
"... the Gulf waters, other than the 3-mile maritime belts, are
historic waters and subject to a joint sovereignty of the three
coastal states" 4 5 and that the waters of the Gulf are "the subject of
[a] condominium or co-ownership., 46 The Chamber decided that
...
the Gulf of Fonseca is an historic bay the waters whereof,
having previously to 1821 been under the single control of Spain,
from 1821 to 1839 of the Federal Republic of Central America
were thereafter succeeded to and held in sovereignty by [the three
littoral States], jointly, and continue to be so held but excluding a
belt.., extending three miles (1 marine league) from the littoral
of each of the three States, such belts being under the exclusive
sovereignty of the coastal State.. .."
Judge 4 Oda,
in commenting on the majority opinion, stated in
7
his dissent:
"Another thesis implicit in the 1917 Judgment and the present
Judgment, which heavily relies upon its predecessor is - in the
words of the latter - that "there seems no reason in principle
why a succession should not create a joint sovereignty where a
single and undivided maritime area passes to two or more new
States" (Judgment, para 399). This prompts the question: if
the assumption of unitary status for the entire waters in the
Gulf had been correct in 1821 or 1839, why should the 1917
Judgment and the present Judgment not have preferred the far
more natural interpretation that, once the territory over which
a single state, Spain, and later the Federal Republic of Central
America, had sovereignty was divided into five states as a
result of their independence the authority over and control of
the offshore waters (which had always been considered
appurtenances of the land) might have been divided
correspondingly to the divided territories of those newly
independent Sates, and that the three riparian States of El
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua each inherited authority
over and control of their respective offshore waters of their
own land territory in the Gulf of Fonseca?"

44. The author of this article agrees with the well-reasoned dissent of Judge
Oda.
45. See id. at 297. This quote is taken from dissenting opinion of Judge Oda.
It appears in para. 404 of the main opinion.
46. See id. at paragraph 412 and 432(1) (majority opinion).
47. See id. at paragraph 38, Judge Oda's dissenting opinion.
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Judge Oda further states that he agrees that a condominium
may be created by the consent of the states concerned with respect
to the area to which those States could have been entitled
originally. He states that although there is precedent and refers to
the case of the Baie du Figuier,
"... where there has existed a zone of condominium possessed
jointly by France and Spain since 1879 (Judgment, para. 401))
this precedent does not, however, give any ground for
justifying the status of a condominium for the Gulf of Fonseca
in connection with which no agreement between the States
concerned has never existed .. ,,48
9

4
Further, he states:
.. *. The Chamber states: that "the Gulf of Fonseca
is an
historic bay, .... the waters of it are accordingly historic
waters" (Judgment para. 383), that "[w]hat does present a
problem.., is the precise character of the sovereignty which
the three coastal states enjoy in these historic waters" (para.
395), that "[t]he essence of the 1917 decision concerning the
legal status of the waters of the Gulf was ... that these historic
waters were then subject to a 'co-ownership' (condomino) of
the three coastal states" (para. 398), that "the maritime area in
question had long been historic waters under a single State's
sovereignty (para. 401), and that "the Gulf waters, other than
the 3-mile maritime belts are historic waters and subject to a
joint sovereignty of the three coastal States" (para. 404). The
Chamber seems to simply add confusion by its misconception
of what constitutes historic waters."

Judge Oda states in his opinion that he "agrees that a
condominium may be created by the consent of the States
concerned with respect to the area to which those States could
have originally been entitled." 50 Judge Oda does not mean to
suggest any general rule suggesting that the concept of a
condominium should not be applicable in maritime areas.
The approach of the majority of the ICJ could be utilized in
the Caspian region if the States decide to utilize the joint
ownership or condominium approach in order to resolve the
problem of delimitation. On the other hand, an argument could

48.
49.
50.

See id. at 754 (at para. 41).
See id. at 755 (at para. 42).
See id. at 754 (at para. 42).
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be made that
Article 15 of the Convention should apply. It states,
5
as follows: 1
"Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to
each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing
agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its
territorial sea beyond the median line every part of which is
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two
States is measured. The above provision does not apply,
however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or
other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the
two States in a way which is at variance there with."
In commenting on Article 15, Judge Oda mentioned that

...

in other words, the equidistance method is a rule in delimitation of
the territorial sea of the neighboring States either opposite or
adjacent to each other, and the shape of the coast as a baseline is
of importance for measuring the territorial sea .
,52 He went on
to state that "....

while the delimitation of the exclusive economic

zone and the continental shelf between the neighbouring States
should be effected "in order to achieve an equitable solution"
(1982 United Nations Convention, Articles 74 and 83), application
of the equidistance method remains a rule in the delimitation of
the territorial sea .

. ..

53

Against this background, let us look at additional reasons why
a regional approach, rather than unilateral actions, will be
necessary.
B. A Legal Regime Should be Createdfor the Entire Region
What type of legal regime should be created in the Caspian
region? In addition to the equities of the situation, it is necessary
to consider the practicalities of the problem that would occur
without the joint cooperation of all of the littoral States. No
matter what the equidistance method may provide in terms of
resource recovery, if a legal regime is not created which is
considered fair by all of the regional States, delivering the oil may
pose a problem in the future. Why? Because the agreement to
construct a pipeline, estimated at approximately $2.4 million
dollars, would carry Caspian oil to parts the West. The route

51.
52.
53.

Convention, supra,note 3, art. 15.
See Gulf of Fonseca, 1992 I.C.J. at 759, para. 49.
See id. at 759, para. 50.

2000]

THE CASPIAN

would not pass through Russia or Iran. The nations near the
Caspian, which were part of the Soviet Union only a decade ago,
would be driven further away from the influence of Russian and
give the United States greater influence in the region. 54 In
addition, cooperation among the States is essential in order to
protect the environment and the pipelines. A feasibility study
regarding this matter has not been completed.
Recently, the New York Times ran an article regarding what
is called "A New Big-Power Race Starts on a Sea of Crude" in
which the New York Times depicted the "great game" as the
55
selection of a path for the oil that is retrieved from the Caspian.
In order to understand why a legal regime based upon a joint
ownership or condominium approach would be sensible in this
region, one need only look no further than the proposed paths for
the oil. For example, through the Eastern European ports, the
New York Times reported that utilizing Romania, Bulgaria, and
the Ukraine oil could be sent by barge or pipeline straight to
Western Europe from their ports on the Black Sea. 56 As far as
selecting a path for the oil through Russia, the Times points out
that the Soviet era pipelines still exist, that they could be
57
supplemented and that the Russians are eager to do this.
However, American oil companies and the newly independent
countries of the Caucasus want alternative routes-partly to avoid
new dependence on Russia and partly to side step unstable areas
of Russia like Chechnya. Another selection could be a route to
China. A feasibility study is due later in 1999 concerning the
possibility of building a natural gas pipeline that would deliver fuel
directly to China through Kazakhstan. Another possibility would
be to have the oil go through Georgia and the Black Sea. Some
American oil companies favor this route for now because building
a new pipeline here would be easier than going through Turkey
because tankers could then go straight to Eastern Europe or out
the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. However, Turkey objects to
the increased traffic through the Bosporus (which is an
international strait and therefore not subject to any regulation bA
Turkey because the Bosporus is equivalent to high seas areas).
54. Supra note 13 at 12.
55. Stephen Kinzer, A New Big-Power Race Starts on a Sea of Crude, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at 4.
56.

Id.

57. See id.
58. See Convention, supra note 3. Part III of the LOS [1982] Convention
addresses five different kinds of straights used for international navigation, each
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with a distinct legal regime:
a. Straits connecting a part of the high seas/EEZ and another
part of the high seas/EEZ (Article 37 - governed by transit
passage).
b. Straits connecting a part of the high seas/EEZ and the
territorial sea of a foreign state (Article 45(1)(a) - regulated
by nonsuspendable innocent passage).
c. Straits connecting one part of the high seas/EEZ and another
part of the high seas/EEZ where the strait is formed by an
island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland, if there
exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas/EEZ
of similar convenience with regard to navigation and
hydrographic characteristics (Article 38(1) - regulated by
nonsuspendable innocent passage).
d. Straits regulated in whole or in part by international
conventions (Article 35(c)). The Convention does not alter
the legal regime in straits regulated by long-standing
international conventions in force specifically relating to such
straits.
e. Straits through archipelagic waters governed by archipelagic
sea lanes passage (Article 53(4)).
Robert W. Smith & J. Ashley Roach, U.S. Dep't of State, Limits in the Seas, No.
112, United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims 301 (Mar. 9,
1992).
Article 34 of the Convention governs the legal status of waters forming
straits used for international purposes:
a. The regime of passage through straits used for international
navigation established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the
exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sovereignty
or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil.
b. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the
straits, is exercised subject to this Part and to other rules of
international law.
Article 22 of the Convention governs the sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes in the territorial sea as follows:
a. The coastal State may, where necessary having regard to the
safety of navigation, require foreign ships exercising the right
of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or
prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships.
b. In particular, tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships
carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances or materials may be required to confine their
passage to such sea lanes.
c.
In the designation of sea lanes and the prescription of traffic
separation schemes under this article, the coastal State shall
take into account:
d. the recommendations of the competent international
organization;
e. any channels customarily used for international navigation;
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Another route would be through Turkey to Georgia. This route is
favored by the United States which sees the route as another way
to assist Turkey as well as assume delivery of oil to the
Mediterranean through a friendly territory and promote as much
independence as possible in the former Soviet Republics.
American oil companies state that they would need major
subsidies because of the expense involved if this route is utilized.
Another possibility would be to have the oil go through Iran. This
route would be the cheapest alternative. Currently, American
companies are forbidden from doing business with the existing
Iranian regime although there are intensive lobbying efforts being
made to change this position. This route would necessitate

building an 1,080 mile pipeline that would begin in Azerbaijan's
capital, Baku, cross Georgia and Turkey and end in Turkey's
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The oil would be shipped from
there onto tankers and eventually to western countries. If Turkey
guarantees the building of a Turkish pipeline, it is estimate that it
would cost the oil companies no more than $1.4 billion dollars.
The entire cost of construction
of this type of pipeline would cast
59
$2.4 billion dollars.
Finally, the oil could go through Afghanistan as Pakistan
would like to develop this route. However, Afghanistan has been
in the grip of a civil war for a decade and its current rulers, are
considered to be the most radical of all Islamic regimes.
The interesting point here is that any unilateral declaration
would not carry much force in the region because it seems that
each State in the region is dependant upon other States in order to
develop and ship their oil and gas out of the region.
In summary, it is apparent that the most beneficial method
for development of the Caspian region is to have a legal regime
based upon a condominium approach in order to guarantee safe
pipeline passage for the oil. The countries could work together in
order to establish a regional approach toward handling
environmental problems that are currently, and will be in the
future, facing the States. It should be pointed out that a regional
f.
g.
h.

the special characteristics of particular ships and channels; and
the density of traffic.
The coastal State shall clearly indicate such sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes on charts to which due publicity
shall be given.
See id. at art. 22.
59. Supra note 55; supra note 7; see also Jane Perlez, U.S. Deal on Caspian
Oil Still Faces Problem With Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at 6.
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successful

A Regional Approach to Caspian Environmental Issues

The World Bank has produced a draft "Concept Paper"
entitled the "Caspian Environmental Program." 60 The Concept
Paper provides descriptions of the actions that could be
undertaken by the Caspian governments (Azerbaijan, Iran,
Kazakstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) in cooperation with
international donors. ".... The overall goal of the program will be
to promote sustainable development and management of the
Caspian environment over the long-term (approximately 20
years) ......
61 Subsidiary goals have also been identified as
62
follows:
1. Understanding and learning to live with the Caspian
water level fluctuation;
2. Abatement of existing and prevention of new types of
pollution and deterioration of the Caspian environment
and its bioresources;
3. Recovery and rehabilitation of those elements of the
Caspian environment (including biological diversity) that
are degraded and that still have potential for recovery;
and
4. Long-term sustainability of environmental quality and
bioresources for the present and future human
populations of the region.
The Concept Paper goes on in length to describe what would
be the main components of these goals. It also states that the
program would draw extensively on lessons learned from other
regional seas programs (e.g., Baltic Sea Program, Black Sea
Program, Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance
Program).
If a regional approach is not utilized and agreed upon by all
of the littoral States and States surrounding the general
geographic area, it is doubtful that the environmental issues will
be taken into consideration and so the average people of the
region will probably wind up being worse off than ever before.

60.
61.
62.

The World Bank, supra note 18. (The Concept Paper is not paginated.)
Id. at para. 2. (Contained in "Executive Summary.)
Id.
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VI. Conclusion
It is necessary to create a legal regime for the Caspian. This
will allow for proper environmental development and control
throughout the region. As this article is being written, the "bigpower race" is on . Many of the States in the world are quite
interested in making a fortune in the area. Picking the route for
the pipeline would make some countries wealthy while other
countries quite upset over the results. The main reason for having
a legal regime based on a regional approach is so that there is a
foundation or basis from which to work in cooperation so that
countries are satisfied that their interests are being protected. As
we know, the "common heritage of mankind" was a dominating
theme of the 1982 Convention. This would be an outstanding
opportunity to act accordingly. It is important that unilateral
declarations be kept out of this procedure. It is important to
protect the navigational rights of countries through international
straits which is one reason why the concept of "transit" passage
was introduced into the 1982 Convention. All these interestsenvironmental, picking a path for the oil exportation, navigational
rights- resource and nonresource alike, would be better served
by having a solid foundation from which to operate.
If the environmental/ecological problems are not tended to,
this will produce unilateral assertions throughout the region. For
example, it has been reported that more than 50,000 vessels
transited the Bosporus in 1997 in which 7,000 tankers passed
through carrying an estimated 3 billion gallons of oil. 64 The
Turkish government has been making unilateral declarations
threatening to limit passage in an international strait which would
be a clear violation of the 1982 Convention 65 as waters in
international straits are considered high seas (not to mention the
66
fact that they would be in violation of the 1936 Montreux treaty).

63. See Kinzer, supra note 56 at 4.
64. Stephen Kinzer, Fearless Turks' Big Fear? Oil Tankers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1998, at A4.
65. Kinzer, supra, note 2 at 8.
66. See generally Convention, supra note 3. A conference held in Montreux
(Switzerland) from June 22 to July 20, 1936, by delegates from Bulgaria, France,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and Yugoslavia agreed to replace the 1923 Straits Convention (part of the peace
treaty signed with Turkey at Lausanne on July 24, 1923) by a new Convention.
See id. N.J. RENGGER & JOHN CAMPBELL, TREATIES AND
ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD 23 (6th ed. 1995).
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Turkey could point to a tanker accident that occurred more than
four years ago which killed 28 sailors and dumped one million
gallons of oil onto the Istanbul shore. In August, a 900-foot-long
super tanker loaded with seven million barrels of oil ran aground.
Turkey has stated that more than nine million people live within
twenty miles of the narrow Bosporus and it is just a matter of time
before large scale oil spills would reek an unprecedented health
and economic damage.
With the water level of the Caspian rising at the rate of seven
feet in the last eighteen years, with wind-induced surges carrying
waves as far as twelve miles inland with the probability that the
sea level will rise another seven to ten feet it is not inconceivable
that sea water could drown thousands of square miles of towns
navigation by sea and air in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles;
for the demilitarization of both shores of the straits, the Sea of
Marmora and certain islands in the Aegean Sea; and for the
establishment in Constantinople (now Istanbul) of an
international commission to supervise the implementation of
the convention. The 1936 Convention essentially restored
Turkish sovereignty over the straits area by ending their
demilitarization and transferring the duties of the international
commission to the Turkish government.
a. The principal provisions of the 1936 Convention are:
b. If Turkey considers itself in danger the strait must remain
open to merchant ships, but strait entry must be made by
day and Turkey may dictate the route (art. 2). (Traffic
schemes have been in force since May 1, 1982.) In time of
peace, light surface craft (whether those of the Black Sea
power or not) have complete freedom of passage through
the straits (Art. 10).
c. Black Sea powers are granted broad use of the straits,
including use for torpedo boats, submarines, and vessels
carrying heavy tonnage (with some restriction) (art. 11).
d. Non-courtesy visits of non-Black Sea powers must adhere
to notice and tonnage restrictions (art. 11).
e. Warships of belligerent powers shall be accorded passage
if they are serving a humanitarian purpose as defined by
the League of Nations.
Passage of warships is left to the discretion of the Turkish government in times of
war where Turkey is a belligerent, or when Turkey considers itself menaced by
"an imminent danger of war." (art. 11).
Although the Convention provided, in paragraph 3 of Article 28, that it
would remain in force for 20 years, it was also laid down in that article that it
would continue to be in force only until two years after a contracting party had
given notice of denunciation of the Convention "two years prior to the expiry of
the said period of 20 years." No such notice has been given; therefore, the
Convention is still in force, the parties being Australia, Belgium, France, Greece,
Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
See id. at 23-24.
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and farms as well as billions of dollars worth of oil wells, pipelines
and refineries. 67 Oceanographer Ms. Marzakhan Mansimov states
that in Azerbaijan alone "... about 50 settlements and 220
industrial enterprises, 18 kilometers (11 miles) of railroad, 10,000
hectares (24,700) acres of grass land and farms that serve 100,000
people are exposed to flooding." 6 8 Nobody knows why the
Caspian is rising and the various speculations include warming
effects of pollution-related greenhouse gases on the Russian
Arctic icecaps that feed the sea, oscillations in the Earth's crust,
and unexpected effects of dam constructions. 69 It would seem that
all the Caspian governments are facing this problem so that the
next logical step would be one of regional cooperation. There is
simply no room for unilateral declarations in the area, if the
delicate balance between the environment and development is to
be maintained for the "common heritage of mankind."

67. Frank Viviano, Nightmare Underneath Caspian Basin; Oil Region is
Previewedfor an Ecological Crisis, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 1998, at 7.
68. See id at 9.
69. Id. at 9.

